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Although radon exposure in the home increases the risk of lung cancer, this risk can be 
managed. However, evidence indicates that testing for radon and subsequent home 
remediation rates are generally low in many countries. The present perspective outlines 
some key insights from psychological science that might account for sub-optimal radon 
protection. Psychological aspects of how the health risks posed by radon are perceived 
and managed are outlined. There is need to consider radon risk perception in terms of 
the (a) cognitive and emotional responses to radon and (b) social context in which the 
radon threat occurs. In addition, the nature of the threat itself is integral to the failure for 
people to act in response to a radon threat. Finally, the challenges arising from defensive 
processing of radon threat information are outlined.
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Lung cancer is the leading cause of cancer-related deaths worldwide. Following tobacco smoke, 
exposure to radon is the second leading cause of lung cancer in many countries, including the 
USA (1). The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that radon causes up to 14% of lung 
cancers worldwide (2). Each year, according to current estimates by the US EPA (3), approximately 
21,000 lung cancer deaths in the United States are associated with radon exposure; in Canada, 
an estimated 3,000 deaths are associated with radon (4). Radon (Rn-222) is a colorless, tasteless, 
odorless natural radioactive noble gas that originates from the decay of uranium-238, a naturally 
occurring radioactive mineral found in the earth crust. The levels of radon gas can build up 
indoors, especially in the lower levels of a building. Once inhaled, the radioactive decay products 
of radon can adhere to cells lining the lungs thus exposing the sensitive bronchial epithelial cells 
to alpha radiation, which can lead to lung cancer. Radon levels in the home can be easily tested 
for and homes can be remediated to reduce the associated risk; however, the literature in general 
indicates low levels of radon testing and home remediation. Such low levels of testing are not 
exclusively caused by cost: when offered radon tests for free, less than 40% of the residents in an 
area with high radon levels availed of the offer (5). Many people underestimate the seriousness 
or long-term health effects of radon exposure. Furthermore, even when individuals are informed 
that their homes have high radon levels and are made aware of the consequent health threats, 
remediation rates are still low (6). A review comparing remediation rates in Ireland with other 
countries indicated high variability between countries; in general, only one in five remediate in 
response to dangerous levels of radon (7).
Comprehensive multi-media information programmes to increase radon testing and remediation 
internationally are successful at increasing awareness of radon; however, research consistently finds 
low levels of radon testing and remediation following such programmes (7–9). It is in this context 
that the present perspective examines the psychological aspects of how the health risks posed by 
radon are perceived and managed.
In many countries, radon testing and remediation are the responsibility of the individual: con-
sequently, the goal of public awareness communications is to help individuals take appropriate 
tABLe 1 | steps required for action to occur after radon information 
programme.
 1. I am exposed to the information.
 2. I attend to the information (notice it).
 3. I am interested in the information.
 4. I understand the information.
 5. I believe that there is a threat: the information must be perceived as 
being credible.
 6. The threat is comprehensible: I understand the threat.
 7. I perceive it as a possible risk: the threat may affect me (I may be 
susceptible) and it may have very negative health consequences for me 
(it is severe).
 8. I believe that the threat level can be assessed.
 9. I know how to get the threat level assessed.
10. I want to get the threat level assessed.
11. I act to get the threat level assessed: test.
12. I understand the results.
13. I perceive that I am at risk (I am susceptible to a severe negative 
outcome).
14. I want to reduce this risk.
15. I know how to reduce this risk.
16. I act to reduce the risk: remediate.
17. I act to confirm that the risk has been managed: re-test.
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preventive action. The individual is responsible for (i) testing 
to determine to what extent radon is present, (ii) deciding if the 
level poses a threat, (iii) selecting an appropriate remediation 
strategy, (iv) implementing the remediation strategy, and (v) 
retesting to ensure that remediation has been successful. To 
ensure that the individual has the requisite knowledge to make 
an informed decision regarding radon, the government’s role 
is typically to provide information to individuals regarding the 
threat radon poses, its assessment, and potential remediation 
strategies. The information provision approach is based on an 
assumption that individuals will act rationally in relation to 
the information provided; once you tell people that there is a 
threat, they will be motivated to test to see if they personally 
are at risk from the threat, they will test, and then they will act 
to remediate if the test indicates a threat. However, if we break 
down the process of translating the information into necessary 
behaviors, there are a number of stages that need to occur 
for an individual to act following an information programme 
(Table 1).
The above list, which arguably is an over-simplification of 
the process, comprises a mixture of the awareness programme 
content and the individual’s perceptions, knowledge, motivation, 
and actual behavior. A number of steps need to occur before 
an individual will test and then remediate. This sequence is 
predicated on the assumption of a rational actor responding to 
health threat information, i.e., an informed individual tends to 
behave in the best interests of their health (10). However, such 
an assumption does not fit with psychological research on risk 
perception and risk-reducing behaviors: a key theme in this paper 
is that people can respond to health threat information in a sub-
rational manner, and that such responses reflect both powerful 
unconscious and deliberate psychological processes. In order to 
better understand the failures of individuals to act to assess and 
then remediate against the threat from radon, the psychology of 
risk perception needs to be considered.
risK PercePtiON
How the individual perceives the risk of radon determines 
decision-making regarding radon testing and remediation. 
Perceived risk is associated with both intentions to test as well as 
actual radon test ordering (11). In addition, among those in areas 
of high radon levels, the perception of radon as a health risk is 
related to intentions to conduct radon testing and remediation 
(12). Although risk from an epidemiological perspective broadly 
refers to a quantitative measure of the probability of experiencing 
some negative outcome, risk from a psychological perspective is 
a far more complex and nuanced construct. For example, risk 
perception can be defined as “people’s beliefs, attitudes, judg-
ments, and feelings, as well as the wider social or cultural values 
and dispositions that people adopt, toward hazards and their 
benefits” (13). This definition explicitly highlights the inherent 
complex multidimensional (cognitive and emotional responses) 
and context-specific (e.g., community, cultural and social values, 
and behaviors) aspects to risk perception. Consequently, we need 
to consider radon risk perception in terms of the (a) cognitive and 
emotional responses to radon, and (b) social context in which the 
radon threat occurs.
cognitive and emotional responses to 
radon
In the rational actor approach, individuals should process health 
threat information in an objective and considered manner, 
and this appraisal of threat will determine their behaviors in 
response to being made aware of the threat. Psychological theory 
and research regarding how people actually respond to health 
threats such as radon paints a more complex picture of how we 
process health threat information. A number of well-established 
cognitive heuristics (“mental shortcuts”) (14, 15) impact on our 
risk perception of radon, which impede appropriate behavioral 
responses.
Availability refers to our tendency to judge the likelihood 
of future events, such as developing lung cancer due to radon, 
based on how easy it is to imagine them or to recall similar 
events in memory. In general, if people cannot recall either 
someone developing lung cancer due to radon, then such 
examples are not available to form a judgment that radon is 
a risk to one’s health. Although people can recall hearing of 
radon, how many will be able to recall someone developing 
or dying from lung cancer due to it? In the absence of such 
associations, the risk can be downplayed or ignored in the 
majority of the population.
Representativeness refers to how individuals make judgments 
about the likelihood of an event based on its resemblance to their 
past experiences or assumptions. It reflects a principal means by 
which judgments are made: whether or not something is a mem-
ber of a broader category. For example, smoking is commonly 
accepted as a member of a broader category of things that are 
risks for lung cancer. Similarly, someone getting lung cancer after 
a period living next to a nuclear plant fits within these assump-
tions; however, in the context of radon, getting lung cancer from 
simply being in one’s own home does not fit these assumptions 
and experiences. People tend to worry more about radiation from 
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nuclear plants than radiation in their home; consequently, people 
negate the risk from radon in the home.
Unrealistic optimism occurs when individuals have unrea-
sonably low estimates of their own susceptibility to harm. For 
example, people who did not test radon in a high risk area in 
the US held “optimistic biases” whereby they underestimated 
the risks associated with their own exposure to radon (16). 
Furthermore, such unrealistic optimism was present among 
respondents living in a very high radon area in Ireland; in 
essence, participants believed that radon was a threat to others 
in the community but not for themselves—hence, no need to 
test or worry about radon (17).
Our emotional response to a threat can influence on decisions 
regarding testing and remediation. For example, fear of cancer 
diagnosis and its symptoms and embarrassment are recurring 
themes in the research literature on barriers to attending cancer 
screening (18). Similar issues may contribute to the failure to test 
for radon. This issue is considered later in the context of defensive 
processing of threat information. Of note, individuals feel more 
threatened by a description of radon that assigns radon agency 
(19): people are more worried by radon that is described as 
deliberately targeting a home (e.g., “Radon gas invades people’s 
homes”) than a literal description of radon dissemination into 
a home (e.g., “Radon gas seeps into people’s homes”). Assigning 
agency to radon primes an emotional response to the threat to our 
home and sense of security. We have an emotional identification 
with our homes: consequently, it is hard to accept that our home 
(our physical and psychological place of safety and security) is a 
threat to our health.
Features of radon
In general, a core challenge for communicating radon risk and 
promoting radon remediation relates to the fact that radon threat 
is inherently perceived as either being low or simply non-existent 
(5, 9). The nature of radon and its threat level serve to minimize 
an urgency to act accordingly. Radon is a colorless, odorless, and 
tasteless gas. Consequently, there is an absence of sensory cues to 
alert people to the risk: such cues to action typically help motivate 
behavior (20). Radon does not seem to cause any visible health 
effects and in the absence of sensory cues the risk is, in essence, 
out of mind. The risk from radon is natural: in general, we perceive 
technological threats to be more risky than natural threats (21). 
It is arguable that if the lung cancer rate caused by the natural 
process of radon emission was associated with a manufactured 
process, there would be widespread outrage and immediate calls 
for governmental action.
Overall, the level of risk associated with radon is perceived as 
being so low that the risk is not understood or appropriately acted 
upon. In general, for low levels of risk, people can easily dismiss 
the risk as being too small to worry about (22) as we do not see it 
as being likely to happen to ourselves (unrealistic optimism also 
influences this judgment). The experience of the radon risk is 
benign as people live with the risk, sometimes for many decades, 
without experiencing any side effects or symptoms. In addition, 
the effect of the risk is far removed from the initial exposure: the 
lung cancer will develop decades later and, as there are no early 
symptoms to act as cues, it is easy to delay action.
social context to radon threat
For individuals in a community, risk perception is informed 
by a wider framing of the issue, derived from their personal 
experiences in a given context, including how their interpersonal 
networks respond to the risk (23). Risk perceptions are affected 
by the norms of the groups with which people identify. In 
essence, lay risk perception is based on a wider framing of topics, 
considerations, and agendas. Risks are shared and experienced 
collectively. People look to their social networks for information 
and guidance, particularly their trusted sources. In terms of 
radon, this implies that if there is no collective action in relation 
to radon testing and remediation then the individual may not 
perceive it as being a threat to be concerned about. Indeed, such 
social norms influenced attitudes toward testing in a particularly 
high radon area (where one house had radon levels 245 times the 
national reference level for Ireland): individuals reported that as 
others in the community did not test, then themselves would not 
test for radon (17). In summary, radon risk perception reflects 
personal experiences and circumstances and is highly influenced 
by social context.
DeFeNsive risK iNFOrMAtiON 
PrOcessiNG
At a basic level, how we process risk information can result in our 
not taking appropriate prevention action. Exposure to a health 
threat communication initiates two appraisal processes: threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal (24). Individuals will appraise 
the threat portrayed in the communication, and the more they 
believe they are vulnerable to a serious threat, the more motivated 
they will be to engage in coping appraisal. However, if the radon 
threat is perceived as irrelevant (“It affects other people’s houses, 
not mine”) or insignificant (“The threat is so low”), then there is 
no motivation to process the radon information any further, and 
individuals will simply ignore the remainder of a communication. 
As noted previously, unrealistic optimism and the challenges of 
understanding low probabilities can act to minimize our sense of 
susceptibility and severity to the radon threat. In addition, people 
believe that they can, at a later point, undo any radon-related dam-
age they have done to themselves by inaction at present or in the 
past (25)—which further serves to reduce the need to remediate 
immediately as the severity of the threat can “minimized” through 
later action.
When the radon risk is believed to be serious and relevant, 
individuals will become scared, and their fear should motivate 
them to consider their coping alternatives. However, research 
evidence indicates that the more personally significant a health 
message is, the more people are likely to downplay the serious-
ness of the health risk, question the accuracy of the threatening 
information or evidence presented in the message, and process 
the information in a biased fashion (26–28). The main audience 
of radon messages is the at-risk population (i.e., those who live 
in an area with high levels of radon), but these people may also 
the most difficult to persuade because they often defensively 
process the information as it is too threatening (“You are at risk 
of developing lung cancer due to radon”). When presented with 
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such a message, an individual can engage in defensive mecha-
nisms that function to reduce the threat (29, 30). People mostly 
at risk, those for whom the message is most personally relevant, 
are typically the ones most likely to employ defensive techniques 
such as message avoidance (31) or denial of susceptibility (32). 
Increased personal relevance affects the type of processing used 
and subsequent evaluation of message information (27, 28). 
For example, “defensive systematic processing” characterizes 
how those individuals at risk are more critical of portions of the 
persuasive messages linking their behavior with a threat and less 
critical of the portions of the message that shed doubt on that link 
(28). For example, an individual will actively try hard to question 
the evidence for the relationship between radon and lung cancer, 
but will devote less cognitive effort to evaluate a statement that 
radon is an odorless gas. Individuals can process information 
systematically with a bias toward information that maintains the 
current status quo, which will inhibit their behavioral responses 
to actually test or remediate.
sUMMArY
Risk has a cognitive aspect (i.e., what we know about the risk) 
and an emotional aspects (i.e., what we feel in terms of dread or 
fear about it). Until relatively recently health and environmental 
threat communications have tended to focus on the cognitive 
aspects (in the assumption that people are rational actors once 
provided with relevant information), whereas research con-
sistently shows that individuals’ actions can be driven by the 
emotional aspects of risks and the need to manage the emotional 
threat to self. Information will only act as a driver of behavior 
only if it can overcome the numerous biases that individuals have 
toward processing risk information. When risks threaten, some 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms push people toward action; 
others push them toward inaction. The threat from radon can 
easily be downplayed to justify inaction.
Risk perception is a complex psychological process of meaning-
making by the individual; it is subject to numerous unconscious, 
cognitive, and emotional biases that influence how we process 
radon information. These biases act to minimize our sense of risk. 
Given these challenges, it is not surprising that radon threats fail 
to promote appropriate precautionary behavior. Even where there 
is awareness of radon, apathy rather than a sense of urgency tends 
to be reported (16). There are no immediacy markers of threat: 
there are no obvious “dead bodies,” and the radon-related lung 
cancer occurs in the distal future (33).
A multidisciplinary approach, involving ongoing collabora-
tion with experts from the field of psychology, has been advo-
cated as essential to solve the problems associated with a lack 
of radon remediation (34). A core challenge for risk awareness 
programmes is to inform the target audience in ways that do not 
create undue apathy, complacency, or overconfidence while also 
not creating undue stress or alarm (35). For radon, this is quite 
a complex challenge, as the risk is perceived as distal, uncertain, 
and easily discounted. The present paper has highlighted some of 
the challenges that risk communicators must address to enhance 
radon testing and remediation rates.
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